Leading by Example: A Comparison of New Zealand\u27s and the United States\u27 Invasive Species Policies Note by Boonstra, Flynn
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2011 
Leading by Example: A Comparison of New Zealand's and the 
United States' Invasive Species Policies Note 
Flynn Boonstra 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Boonstra, Flynn, "Leading by Example: A Comparison of New Zealand's and the United States' Invasive 
Species Policies Note" (2011). Connecticut Law Review. 114. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/114 
 1185 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 43 MAY 2011 NUMBER 4 
 
Note 
  
LEADING BY EXAMPLE: A COMPARISON OF NEW ZEALAND’S AND THE 
UNITED STATES’ INVASIVE SPECIES POLICIES 
FLYNN BOONSTRA 
Invasive species pose a threat to native ecosystems and to the 
economy.  It is estimated that the United States spends $138 billion 
annually in agricultural losses, infrastructure damage, and management 
costs stemming from invasive species.  The United States’ invasive species 
management policy is a conglomeration of federal and state statutes that 
do not coalesce into a comprehensive policy.  As a result, the country has 
many open pathways for introduction and lacks a mechanism to identify 
those pathways.  In contrast, New Zealand is a world-leader in its 
comprehensive and proactive invasive species policy.  Although the United 
States faces unique challenges with regard to invasive species 
management, it can learn many lessons from New Zealand’s program.  
This Note analyzes the United States’ and New Zealand’s invasive 
species policies and makes suggestions for improvement in the United 
States’ policy based on this analysis.  Ultimately this Note argues that the 
United States must increase accountability, move to a preventative 
importation policy for new species entering the country, and integrate its 
various statutes to create a comprehensive policy across all pathways of 
invasion.
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LEADING BY EXAMPLE: A COMPARISON OF NEW ZEALAND’S AND THE 
UNITED STATES’ INVASIVE SPECIES POLICIES 
FLYNN BOONSTRA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In our ever-growing global economy, one unintended consequence is 
the rise of invasive species.  When humans break down natural barriers to 
the movement of species by transporting new species of plants or animals 
to new ecosystems, the order of those ecosystems is disturbed.  Not every 
non-native organism poses harm to its new environment, but those that do 
can be overwhelming in their devastation because a new species is 
suddenly introduced into an environment in which it has no natural 
predators.1  As one example, on islands off the coast of Australia, rats, 
which had stowed away in British ships, killed off forty percent of the 
indigenous forest bird life in five years.2   
Invasive species are considered a significant component of global 
environmental change.3  In other words: this problem is not going 
anywhere.  New Zealand is made up of two islands, each of which is 
vulnerable to invasion because of its unique ecosystem.4  In response, the 
country has established a biosecurity strategy on the forefront of national 
invasive species policy.  Part II of this Note will discuss the economic and 
environmental effects of invasive species in the United States and discuss 
the main pathways of introduction through which these invaders come into 
the country.  Part III will address a few key U.S. regulations that attempt to 
solve this problem and analyze how successful they have been.  Part IV of 
the Note will analyze trends in state specific laws and regulations 
attempting to address invasion.  Part V will look to New Zealand law, 
long-touted as being a leader in invasive species regulation, to see what the 
United States can learn.  Part VI will apply the lessons from New Zealand 
law and propose a more effective legislative direction for the United States 
                                                                                                                          
* Williams College, B.A. 2004; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2011.  I would 
like to thank Professor Kurt Strasser for his help and guidance during the creation of this Note.  I would 
also like to thank the Connecticut Law Review for their help in the editing process.  This Note is 
dedicated to my parents and Edward Wojtowicz for all their love and support.  All errors contained 
herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 Todd E. McDowell, Comment, “Slow-Motion Explosion”: The Global Threat of Exotic Species 
and the International Response to the Problem in the South Pacific, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 187, 190 (1998). 
2 Id. at 192. 
3 Id. at 187. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 165–75 for a discussion of the ecosystem of New Zealand 
and its vulnerability to invasive species. 
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in its attempt to forestall new invasions and to mitigate those that are 
already underway. 
II.  EFFECT ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 
Invasive species pose a threat to native ecosystems and to the 
economy.  It is estimated that the United States spends $138 billion 
annually in agricultural losses, infrastructure damage, and management 
costs stemming from invasive species.5  Regions particularly susceptible to 
invasive species are left to bear the majority of these costs.  Zebra mussels, 
major aquatic invaders in the United States which particularly affect the 
Great Lakes region, are estimated to cause about $270 million in economic 
damage per year.6  Dave Strayer of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies 
in Millbrook, New York, characterized this figure as an “underestimate” of 
the amount of economic damage actually done by the zebra mussel 
invasion.7 
Current legislation addressing the problem of invasive species 
highlights the extent to which it affects the economies of areas susceptible 
to invasion and the extent to which the populace of these areas demands 
solutions.  In November 2009, President Obama passed into law a $475 
million restoration program “aimed at stopping the deterioration of the 
[Great] [L]akes because of pollution, mismanagement, invasive species 
and other issues.”8 
Lake Tahoe, known as the “jewel of the Sierras” is prized for the 
clarity of its water and the pristine nature of the surrounding area.9  The 
clarity of Lake Tahoe has decreased from 100 feet to less than seventy 
feet10 as a result of pollution and invasive species, such as the Asian 
clam.11  These invaders increase the amount of organic material in the 
lakes, creating algal blooms that result in decreased lake clarity and may 
pave the way for more serious invaders, such as zebra mussels.12  
                                                                                                                          
5 Michael Risinit, Invasives Threaten N.Y.’s Natural Order, J. NEWS (Westchester Cnty., N.Y.), 
Sept. 28, 2009, at 1.  This number is merely an estimate, although other estimates fall close to that 
number.  Scientists at Cornell determined the expenditures in the United States to be about $137 billion 
in 2000, which indicates that the number today may be much higher than the Journal News’s estimate 
indicates.  Mitsuhiko A. Takahashi, Are the Kiwis Taking a Leap?—Learning from the Biosecurity 
Policy of New Zealand, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 461, 462–63 (2005).   
6 Risinit, supra note 5. 
7 Id. 
8 Ernst-Ulrich Franzen, Great Lakes: Preserving a Heritage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 11, 
2009, at 12. 
9 Sen. Feinstein Joins California, Nevada Delegations in Introducing Legislation To Preserve, 
Protect Lake Tahoe, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 4, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 21991170 [hereinafter 
Sen. Feinstein] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Op-Ed., Restoring Lake Tahoe, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/nov/08/restoring-lake-tahoe/. 
11 Amy Littlefield, Tiny Clams Plague Tahoe, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009, at 4. 
12 Id.; Nev., Calif. Hatch Plan To Battle Invasives, GREENWIRE, Aug. 21, 2009. 
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Legislation introduced before the 111th Congress proposes an eight-year, 
$415 million bill, which will cover a host of ecological problems plaguing 
Lake Tahoe, including $20.5 million for watercraft inspections and 
removal of existing invasive species.13  This legislation has stalled in both 
houses of Congress, and the scope of this serious problem in Lake Tahoe 
remains unaddressed.14 
A.  Pathways of Invasion 
Current regulatory and common-law systems in the United States are 
insufficient to deal with the problems of existing and potential invaders.  
There are three categories of invasion pathways that any regulation must 
address.  First, there is the intentional introduction of invasive species,15 
such as carp introduced into United States rivers by the United States Fish 
Commission.16  The second pathway is the intentional importation of 
captive invasive species that accidentally escape into the ecosystem,17 such 
as reptiles, including boa constrictors and pythons in southern Florida.18  
Finally, the third pathway of invasion concerns species that are 
unintentionally introduced in connection with the operation and ownership 
of property, such as the brown tree snake invasion in Guam.19 
All three of the species listed above are large targets of regional and 
national control.  The national and state governments are willing to go to 
extreme measures to protect valuable assets from invasion.  The common 
carp was introduced in the 1800s as a food fish, but is now considered a 
noxious invader that threatens the sport fishing industry.20  On October 15, 
2009, the Senate voted to provide $6 million for continuing efforts to stop 
the progressive invasion of the Asian carp into the Great Lakes.21  Electric 
barriers were erected with state and federal money to electrify the invaders 
as they passed through possible entry points to new bodies of water.22  In 
                                                                                                                          
13 Sen. Feinstein, supra note 9. 
14 Lake Tahoe Restoration Act of 2009, 2010 BILL TRACKING H.R. 4001, S. 2724, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
15 Eric Biber, Note, Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the Introduction of Non-
Indigenous Species to the United States, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 383–84 & n.34 (1999). 
16 Daniel P. Larsen, Combatting the Exotic Species Invasion: The Role of Tort Liability, 5 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 21, 34 (1995). 
17 Biber, supra note 15, at 384. 
18
 Burkhard Bilger, Swamp Things; Florida’s Uninvited Predators, NEW YORKER, Apr. 20, 2009, 
at 80. 
19 Biber, supra note 15, at 385 & n.48; Larsen, supra note 16, at 34–35. 
20 John L. Dentler, Comment, Noah’s Farce: The Regulation and Control of Exotic Fish and 
Wildlife, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 191, 193 (1993); Michael Hawthorne, State To Poison Canal To 
Halt Asian Carp, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 2009, at C4. 
21 Dennis Conrad, Bill Marks $6 Million for Asian Carp Effort: Nuisance Fish Threatens Great 
Lakes, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Oct. 16, 2009, at B2. 
22 Id.; Hawthorne, supra note 20; Asian Carp, DAVE CAMP: U.S. CONGRESSMAN, 
http://camp.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=9768 (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
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2009, Illinois had to close one of those barriers for repair and, as a back-up 
method, poisoned the water with the toxin Rotenone to prevent the Asian 
carp from moving to Lake Michigan.23   
Reptiles, like boa constrictors, Burmese pythons, and Nile monitor 
lizards, are pervasive invaders in Florida.24  Some of these invaders were 
released into the wild from pet owners who realized that a twenty-foot-
long python may have been more than they reckoned for.25  It is 
hypothesized that the current high level of invasion is due to the 
devastating effects of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which may have 
dispersed reptiles awaiting sale and held in warehouses like “[f]risbees, 
flung by the storm.”26  The response to these “reptiles of concern” has been 
state-based.  Florida requires owners of a “reptile of concern” to be 
licensed,27 to buy a $100-per-year permit,28 and to implant the animal with 
a microchip.29  The state has also been willing to take more intrusive 
action.  The National Park Service is training beagles to detect reptiles in 
the wild,30 and the state is licensing hunters to kill reptiles in the wild.31 
Brown tree snakes were introduced onto Guam in the 1940s and 1950s 
as stowaways on boats.32  They have made many native Guam species 
locally extinct, such as fruit bats, lizards, and nine out of thirteen native 
forest bird species.33  Representative Mazie Hirono (D-HI) passed through 
the House an earmark of $657,000 to fund the National Wildlife Service’s 
effort to prevent brown tree snakes’ movements from Guam to Hawaii and 
other Pacific Islands.34 
The extreme measures used in the case of Asian carp in the Great 
Lakes, reptiles in Florida, and the brown tree snakes of Guam can 
hopefully be avoided for future invaders through better regulation at the 
                                                                                                                          
23 Hawthorne, supra note 20. 
24 Byron Stout, Strategies Are Under Way To Control Invasive Reptiles, NEWS-PRESS (Fort 
Myers, Fla.), Aug. 9, 2009, at 10A. 
25 Bilger, supra note 18.  
26 Id.  
27 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 379.372 (West 2011). 
28 Id. § 379.373. 
29 Stout, supra note 24. 
30 Id. 
31 Paul Flemming, Op-Ed., The Battle Escalates as Pythons Flourish, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, 
Oct. 9, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 20016760. 
32 Threats to Native Wildlife Species: Hearing Before the S. Env’t and Pub. Works Subcomm. on 
Water and Wildlife and the Subcomm. on Oversight, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Gary Frazer, 
Assistant Dir. for Fisheries and Habitat Conservation, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.), available at 
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=38009204-
802a-23ad-4d13-f2bfbd089682&Witness_ID=153ee964-0d5e-4deb-9562-fa01035105eb. 
33 Id. 
34 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-80, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. (123 Stat.) 2090, 2097–98 (2009) 
(to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2254); Rep. Hirono Secures $16.2 Million in Hawaii Funding in Fiscal 
Year 2010 Agriculture Appropriations Bill, U.S. FED. NEWS, July 10, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 
13142531. 
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pathways of introduction.  
III.  UNITED STATES REGULATIONS 
A.  The Lacey Act 
The Lacey Act was passed in 1900 and was the “first far-reaching 
federal wildlife protection law.”35  The Act was the first federal effort to try 
to stem the tide of introduction and importation of exotic animals.36 
1.  Dirty List Approach 
As currently amended, the Lacey Act prohibits “species of  
[animals] . . . or the offspring or eggs of any of [those animals] . . . which 
the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe by regulation to be injurious to 
human beings, to the interests of agriculture, horticulture, forestry, or to 
wildlife.”37  Under regulations written pursuant to the Act, the importation, 
transportation, and acquisition of all other wildlife with the filing of an 
import declaration with the District Director of the U.S. Customs Service.38   
Congressman Lacey was concerned with the demise of native bird 
species and spoke to the effect this law could have had in combating 
invasive species: 
[I]f [the Lacey Act] had been in force at the time the mistake 
was made in the introduction of the English sparrow we 
should have been spared from the pestilential existence of 
that “rat of the air,” that vermin of the atmosphere.  But some 
gentlemen who thought they knew better than anybody else 
what the country needed saw fit to import these little pests, 
and they have done much toward driving the native wild bird 
life out of the States.39 
Despite the good intentions Congressman Lacey undoubtedly brought 
to the Lacey Act, this legislation would not have stopped the English 
sparrow from invading the northeastern United States.  This is because the 
Lacey Act notoriously uses a “dirty list” approach to managing what 
species are allowed to enter the country or be moved through interstate 
commerce.40  Under the “dirty list” approach, the Secretary of the Interior 
lists species as injurious only when she discovers that a species is already 
                                                                                                                          
35 Laura T. Gorjanc, Combating Harmful Invasive Species Under the Lacey Act: Removing the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Barrier to State and Federal Cooperation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
111, 115 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Dentler, supra note 20, at 210. 
37 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2006). 
38
 50 C.F.R. § 14.52 (West 2011). 
39 Gorjanc, supra note 35, at 115 (alterations in original). 
40 Larsen, supra note 16, at 28; Dentler, supra note 20, at 210–11. 
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causing harm to fish, wildlife, or other interests somewhere in the United 
States.41  This means that although the English sparrow might have 
eventually gotten onto the “dirty list,” it would have still wreaked its havoc 
before reaching the attention of the Department of the Interior.  In addition, 
the Lacey Act is not a particularly flexible piece of legislation.  In order for 
new species to be put on the “dirty list,” the Department of the Interior 
must learn through experience that the species presents harm to fish and 
wildlife or other interests.42  This can take valuable time in a situation 
where time is extremely critical to the successful removal of a harmful 
invasive species.  
2.  Effective Only in Stopping Intentional Introductions   
The Lacey Act also makes it unlawful for anyone “to import, export, 
transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant 
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law . . . of the 
United States or in violation of any Indian tribal law.”43  This provision 
highlights another constraint of the Lacey Act.  While the Act is very good 
at preventing intentional introductions, or introductions where the person 
did not exercise due care that she was carrying a prohibited species,44 it 
cannot appropriately prevent unintentional introductions of species, such as 
the brown tree snake transported to Guam as a stowaway in ships.  It also 
cannot act to prevent the introduction of captive invasive species that 
accidentally escape, like a pet boa constrictor in Florida whose cage was 
not securely closed.45  
3.  The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The other half of the Lacey Act provisions make it unlawful to 
“import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in  
interstate . . . commerce any fish or wildlife [or plant] taken, possessed, 
transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State.”46  
This aspect of the Lacey Act creates a federal supplement to help states 
                                                                                                                          
41 John A. Ruiter, Note, Combating the Non-Native Species Invasion of the United States, 2 
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 259, 265 (1997). 
42 Dentler, supra note 20, at 211.  The experience required is limited to the experience on the 
ground in the area to be regulated.  For example, “[t]he brown tree snake was added to the list of 
injurious wildlife after it was introduced to Guam where it became established, rapidly spread, 
devastated Guam’s endemic bird populations, and threatened human health and safety.”  Id. at 211 
n.110. 
43 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (2006). 
44 Larsen, supra note 16, at 29. 
45 See Ruiter, supra note 41, at 266 (“The Lacey Act should be more active to encourage 
importers to be pro-active in preventing ‘non-negligent, unintentional introductions of exotic 
species.’”); see also Exotic “Pet” Incidents in Florida, ANIMAL RIGHTS FOUND. OF FLA., 
http://www.animalrightsflorida.org/incidentslist.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (listing instances of 
non-native boa constrictor sightings in Florida). 
46 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
 2011] NEW ZEALAND’S AND THE UNITED STATES’ INVASIVE SPECIES POLICIES 1193 
enforce their own laws about wildlife by elevating state law to a federal 
offense.  This has some advantages.  As discussed above, some states are 
much more susceptible to introductions and therefore may be in a unique 
position to understand vectors of introduction and particularities of the 
threat those invaders pose.47 
However, because the Act permits state laws to regulate goods 
transported in interstate commerce, these laws may potentially overburden 
interstate commerce and are therefore susceptible to attack under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.48  The Constitution grants Congress the power 
to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”49  The Constitution 
does not, however, grant exclusive legislation of commerce issues to 
Congress.50  Still, courts will closely scrutinize state law if it directly or 
indirectly affects interstate commerce.  Current Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine states that a state law is invalid if (1) it is facially 
discriminatory against out-of-state commerce;51 (2) it is facially neutral, 
but has an impermissibly protectionist purpose or effect;52 or (3) it is 
facially neutral, but has a disproportionately adverse effect on interstate 
commerce.53 
The Supreme Court directly addressed a state law concerning invasive 
species under the Lacey Act in Maine v. Taylor.54  The law in question 
banned importation of live baitfish into Maine.55  The Court held that this 
legislation was facially discriminatory and was therefore subject to strict 
                                                                                                                          
47 Gorjanc, supra note 35, at 122.  But see Viki Nadol, Aquatic Invasive Species in the Coastal 
West: An Analysis of State Regulation Within a Federal Framework, 29 ENVTL. L. 339, 372 (1999) 
(“By their very nature, [invasive species] are interjurisdictional and, therefore, pose threats that are 
national in scope.  In addition, state-by-state regulation can produce inconsistent results and  
conflicts . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
48 Gorjanc, supra note 35, at 124. 
49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
50 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (“[U]ntil Congress should 
find it necessary to exert its power, it should be left to the legislation of the States . . . [so long as] it is 
local and not national . . . .”). 
51 See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628–29 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey law 
prohibiting the importation of most solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the 
territorial limits of the state was facially discriminatory and therefore invalid). 
52 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350–51 (1977) (holding that 
North Carolina law unduly burdened Washington State by forcing it to adopt a second system of apple 
grading that added costs, thus giving North Carolina growers an unfair advantage within the state), 
superseded by statute, as stated in United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown 
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544 (1996). 
53 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (setting forth a balancing test to 
determine if there is a disproportionate effect, and stipulating that “[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits”). 
54 477 U.S. 131, 132 (1986). 
55 Id. 
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scrutiny,56 despite potential enforcement applicability under the Lacey 
Act.57  This means that every state law under the Lacey Act must meet the 
strict scrutiny test.  Additionally, once a law is considered facially 
discriminatory, the burden is on the state to prove that the law does not 
unduly burden interstate commerce.58 
Nevertheless, the Court found that, in this case, there was a legitimate 
state interest in prohibiting importation of the live baitfish.59  Out-of-state 
fish may transport parasites that local populations do not carry, and the 
water used to transport the baitfish may also contain other non-native 
species that could invade state waters.60  Furthermore, the Court held that, 
while there was an “abstract possibility” of developing testing procedures 
to determine what the threat was of non-native species being transported in 
the baitfish water, without the assurance as to their effectiveness, those 
procedures did not constitute a “nondiscriminatory alternativ[e].”61  
Therefore, although state laws under the Lacey Act will be reviewed under 
strict scrutiny, the Court does consider protection from invasive species to 
be a legitimate state purpose.62  Despite this, by putting the burden on the 
state to show that the law is valid and by applying strict scrutiny, it is 
unclear whether another court might find prevention of invasive species as 
robust a purpose as the Maine Court and might find another 
nondiscriminatory alternative that is less effective.   
The Lacey Act is an important piece of legislation in the prevention of 
invasive species.  Its shortcomings, however, leave large gaps in the effort 
to prevent invasion. 
B.  Executive Order No. 13,112 
President Carter issued an executive order in 1977 that directly 
addressed the need to stop the introduction of non-native species.63  This 
order was generally considered to be a failure and remained largely 
unimplemented.64  The order defined “exotic species” to mean plants and 
                                                                                                                          
56 See id. at 140 (“[T]he statute must serve a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose must be 
one that cannot be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”). 
57 See id. at 139 (refusing to lessen the intensity of the scrutiny under the Lacey Act when there 
was no clear congressional intent under the Act to do so).  
58 Id. at 138. 
59 Id. at 151. 
60 Id. at 141. 
61 Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
62 See id. at 148 (“[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause cannot be read 
as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental 
damage has occurred . . . .” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
63 Exec. Order No. 11,987, 3 C.F.R. 116–17 (1977) (superceded by Exec. Order No. 13,112, 3 
C.F.R. 159 (1999)). 
64 E.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. et al., Legal Tools that Provide Direct Protection for Elements of 
Biodiversity, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 909, 928–29 (2007); Marc. L. Miller, The Paradox of U.S. Alien 
Species Law, in HARMFUL INVASIVE SPECIES: LEGAL RESPONSES 125, 146 (Marc L. Miller & Robert 
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animals “not naturally occurring, either presently or historically, in any 
ecosystem of the United States.”65  This definition was too broad.  It 
characterized exotic species as only those that were outside of the United 
States, rather than acknowledging that invasion could occur between 
ecoregions within the United States.  Additionally, the order, which was 
only a page long, did not include an implementation scheme.  This left 
agencies rudderless as to how to proceed.66 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,112 in 1999, partially in 
response to the ineffectiveness of Carter’s executive order.67  Clinton’s 
order replaced Carter’s and did much to create a more effective policy.  
The stated purpose of the order was to prevent “the introduction of 
invasive species and provide for their control and to minimize the 
economic, ecological, and human health impacts that invasive species 
cause.”68  The order defined invasive species scientifically, as “with respect 
to a particular ecosystem, any species, including its seeds, eggs, spores, or 
other biological material capable of propagating that species, that is not 
native to that ecosystem.”69 
Most important, Clinton’s executive order established the National 
Invasive Species Council, comprised of cabinet officers with significant 
responsibilities related to invasive species.70  The council was required to 
issue a National Invasive Species Management Plan within eighteen 
months of the formation of the council.71  The final draft of the plan was 
issued behind schedule on January 18, 200172 and was “replete with 
specific goals for the council and for specific federal agencies, often with 
target dates attached.”73 
Despite the fact that these goals are highly laudable, most of them have 
yet to be accomplished.74  A report issued by the U.S. General Accounting 
Office in 2002 stated that while the management plan  
                                                                                                                          
N. Fabian eds., 2004); Matthew Shannon, From Zebra Mussels to Coqui Frogs: Public Nuisance 
Liability as a Method To Combat the Introduction of Invasive Species, 32 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y J. 37, 48 (2008). 
65 Exec. Order No. 11,987, 3 C.F.R. 116 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
66 See Miller, supra note 64, at 147 (describing the shortcomings of Executive Order No. 11,987). 
67 Exec. Order No. 13,112, 3 C.F.R. 159 (1999). 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 161. 
71 Id. at 162. 
72 See NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE 44 
(2001), available at http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/docs/council/mpfinal.pdf (listing targets for 
the cataloguing of control techniques for aquatic and terrestrial invasive species as well as targets for 
creating a plan to strengthen research on these issues). 
73 Miller, supra note 64, at 150.  
74 Id. at 151.  Miller also points out that the Management Plan was published two days before 
President Bush took office and that a “shift to an administration where the council included Secretary 
of the Interior Gail Norton as a co-chair and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of 
State Colin Powell . . . made any progress on this plan unlikely.”  Id. at 150–51. 
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calls for actions that are likely to help control invasive 
species, it lacks a clear long-term outcome and quantifiable 
performance criteria against which to evaluate the overall 
success of the plan. . . .  Specifically, the council departments 
have completed less than [twenty] percent of the planned 
actions that were called for by September 2002, although 
they have begun work on others.75   
The report cited several reasons for the program’s lack of success, 
including “delays in establishing implementation teams that will be 
responsible for carrying out the planned actions, the low priority given to 
implementation by the council, and the lack of funding and shortage of 
staff responsible for doing the work.”76 
Despite the small amount of progress made to date through Executive 
Order 13,112, it was a step in the direction of a more comprehensive 
environmental policy.  Creating an agency that is comprised of high-
ranking cabinet officials at least theoretically creates interactions between 
disparate departments that are all dealing with the invasive species problem 
and that may come up with integrated solutions.  Additionally, the 
Management Plan does a good job of setting deadlines and responsibilities.   
The lack of success of the order may simply be its “hyperactive, 
overstructured, action-item nature.”77  But, essentially, the order suffers 
from being a “low priority” for federal agencies.78  Increased 
accountability to specific individuals (instead of to a committee of people), 
increased funding, and increased public awareness would likely make the 
order more successful.79 
C.  Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act and the 
National Invasive Species Act 
The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 
1990 (NANPCA)80 was created to control unintentional introductions of 
invasive species, primarily through ballast water.81  In its original 
                                                                                                                          
75 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-1, INVASIVE SPECIES: CLEARER FOCUS AND 
GREATER COMMITMENT NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE THE PROBLEM 27 (2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031.pdf. 
76 Id. 
77 Miller, supra note 64, at 151. 
78 Shannon, supra note 64, at 48. 
79 See Miller, supra note 64, at 152 (asserting that “[i]f Congress is serious about invasive  
species . . . it will . . . place clearer responsibility on the president and specific cabinet agencies, require 
far more specific reports, and commit more substantial funds to the area”). 
80 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701–51 (2006). 
81 Ships take on and discharge ballast water to compensate for a ship’s weight change with the 
loading and unloading of cargo.  Amy Taylor Sevigny, Recent Development, Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 213, 213 (2007).  “More than 21 billion gallons of 
ballast water are discharged into the United State’s [sic] waterways each year.  As a result of dumping 
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incarnation, NANPCA focused on preventing further spread of invasive 
species in the Great Lakes region and the Hudson Valley watershed 
through ballast water.82  Ships are required to minimize aquatic invasive 
species introduction by exchanging their ballast water away from ports.83  
Violations of these regulations can result in a civil penalty of up to $25,000 
per day or criminal prosecution.84   
Additionally, the statute creates an Aquatic Nuisance Species Task 
Force which must “develop and implement a program for waters of the 
United States to prevent introduction and dispersal of aquatic nuisance 
species; to monitor, control and study such species; and to disseminate 
related information.”85  The statute directs the Task Force to constantly 
monitor for new invasive species and new pathways of unintentional 
introduction.86  Furthermore, “the Task Force or any other affected agency 
or entity may recommend that the Task Force initiate a control effort.”87  If 
the Task Force determines that control of an aquatic invasive is 
warranted,88 then the Task Force will promulgate a new control regulation 
for that vector of invasive species.89  Because this statute is so complicated, 
it is vital that continued research be done on the success of its 
implementation, including such factors as what kind of resources it uses 
and how often the high statutory burdens are in fact met. 
NANPCA was reauthorized and amended by the National Invasive 
Species Act of 1996 (NISA).90  The jurisdiction of the Act was increased 
by the implementation of a national program which ships may elect to 
                                                                                                                          
this ballast water . . . ‘more than 10,000 marine species each day hitch rides around the globe in the 
ballast water of cargo ships.’”  Id. (footnote omitted).  Ballast water is thought to be responsible for the 
spread of many noxious invasive species, including the zebra mussel, which is a thumbnail sized 
organism from the Ukraine that spreads rapidly and causes millions of dollars worth of damage to 
infrastructure by clogging pipes and attaching to boats.  Daniel A. Applegate, Note, The New Cold 
War: The Battle To Prevent Eurasian Invaders from Destroying the Great Lakes, 57 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 391, 392–93 (2007).  
82 Shannon, supra note 64, at 44. 
83 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B). 
84 Id. § 4711(g)(1)–(2). 
85 Id. § 4722(a). 
86 Id. § 4722(d). 
87 Id. § 4722(e)(2). 
88 In order to determine if control is warranted, the Task Force must analyze the following five 
factors: (1) the need for control (including the projected consequences of no control and less than full 
control); (2) the technical and biological feasibility and cost-effectiveness of alternative control 
strategies; (3) whether the benefits of control, including costs avoided, exceed the costs of the program; 
(4) the risk of harm to non-target organisms and ecosystems, public health, and welfare; and (5) other 
considerations the Task Force determines appropriate.  Id. 
89 To promulgate the regulation, the Task Force must publish notice of its proposed program and 
solicit comments in the Federal Register, in major newspapers in the region affected, and in principal 
trade publications of the industries affected.  It can promulgate the rule within 180 days of notice, after 
consultation with affected governmental and other appropriate entities, and after taking into 
consideration other comments received.  Id. § 4722(e)(3). 
90 Pub. L. No. 104-332, 110 Stat. 4073 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 
U.S.C.). 
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participate in and which restricts the release of ballast water within any 
port of the United States.91  Furthermore, the scope of the Act was 
increased to include funding for research of aquatic invasive species in and 
near the Chesapeake Bay, Gulf of Mexico, Pacific Coast, Atlantic Coast, 
and San Francisco Bay.92  The Act further called for a one-time 
demonstration of current ballast-water technologies93 “identified as 
promising” by the National Research Council Marine Board of the 
National Academy of Sciences,94 which was intended to highlight 
innovations in ballast-water management technologies.95  
Both NANPCA and its amending legislation, NISA, reflect an 
important shift to regulation of unintentional introductions.  This 
legislation focuses very narrowly on the unintentional introduction of 
aquatic invaders by ballast water release, a critical vector through which 
many non-native aquatic species infiltrate new waterways.96  Additionally, 
the creation of a Task Force responsible for reviewing and monitoring the 
success of the program is a necessary component of a successful invasive 
species strategy.97 
The Act, however, is still weak in its present form.  First and foremost, 
this program is focused on one pathway of introduction and one 
geographic region, despite the NISA amendments.  The voluntary nature of 
the ballast water restrictions outside of the Great Lakes region greatly 
reduces the efficacy of the regulation.98  In his comments to the President 
about the bill that was to become NISA, Senator John Glenn expressed his 
desire for this voluntary program to transition into mandatory regulation 
for ports outside of the Great Lakes region.99  Despite this intention, to 
date, no such mandatory regulation exists.  There are other vectors for 
transfer of aquatic invasive species within the United States and across 
international borders which this legislation does not attempt to address.   
Additionally, a safety exemption in the statute gives the master of a 
vessel discretion to forego ballast water exchange “if the master decides 
that the exchange would threaten the safety or stability of the vessel, its 
crew, or its passengers because of adverse weather, vessel architectural 
                                                                                                                          
91 16 U.S.C. § 4711(c). 
92 Id. § 4712(e). 
93 Id. § 4714(b)(1). 
94 Id. § 4714(b)(4). 
95 See 142 CONG REC. 27,324 (1996) (statement of Sen. Glenn) (acknowledging that “[o]ver time 
new technologies and practices may replace ballast exchange as safer and more effective means of 
prevention”). 
96 E.g., Applegate, supra note 81, at 392–93. 
97 See Miller, supra note 64, at 149 (discussing how the creation of the Invasive Species 
Management Council was a necessary component to the potential success of Executive Order 13,112). 
98 Nadol, supra note 47, at 358–59. 
99 142 CONG REC. 27,324 (1996) (statement of Sen. Glenn).  At present, the literature is unclear as 
to how often ships use this program. 
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design, equipment failure, or any other extraordinary conditions.”100  
Particularly surprising here is equating “vessel architectural design” with 
an “extraordinary circumstance[].”101  Equipment failure or adverse 
weather conditions are unexpected occurrences—vessel architectural 
design is a known quantity.  Perhaps if the United States mandated that all 
vessels entering the Great Lakes must be able to perform a ballast water 
exchange, then more vessels in use today would have that capability.  This 
would increase the ability of countries with less political and economic 
power to make similar regulations. 
Recognizing this flaw, Senator Glenn noted that, “[w]hile the safety 
exemption clearly could still be exploited by those who simply do not want 
to undertake an exchange, ship masters have highly responsible positions 
and we would expect them to act responsibly with respect to these 
guidelines.”102  This level of trust may be misplaced in light of the large 
amount of intra and international traffic which moves through U.S. ports 
on a daily basis.  Ship masters trying to save a little time on busy routes 
may have no idea of the amount of devastation that can be wreaked by not 
complying with ballast water exchange regulations.  Reliance on their 
responsibility will mean nothing if they are unaware of the importance of 
these regulations. 
The Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act was a bill 
proposed by the House of Representatives in the 111th Congress and could 
have solved many of the deficiencies of NANPCA as amended by NISA.103  
It would have required certain vessels operating on the waters of the 
United States to have an aquatic invasive species management plan104 and, 
with a few exceptions, required all ships to comply with ballast water 
management regulations if they are on the waters of the United States.105   
Additionally, the proposed legislation would have expanded 
NANPCA’s regulatory ambit beyond ballast water.  By two years after 
passage of the Act, and every three years thereafter, the Task Force would 
have to identify pathways that pose the highest risk for introduction of 
invasive species nationally and regionally.106  The bill also sets out a 
screening process for planned importation of aquatic organisms to “prevent 
                                                                                                                          
100 Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 § 1101(k)(1), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 4711(k)(1) (2006). 
101 See David P. Eldridge, Comment, Leviathan Lurks: Might the National Invasive Species Act of 
1996 Actually Authorize Invasion by Proscribed Species?, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 57 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (noting that the architectural design of a vessel is not extraordinary if ballast 
exchange is not beneficial to the vessel). 
102 142 CONG. REC. 27,325 (1996) (statement of Sen. Glenn). 
103 Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act, H.R. 500, 111th Cong. (2009). 
104 Id. § 101(a).  The Secretary would need to determine to which vessels this regulation would 
apply.  Id.  
105 Id.  Exempted from this regulation would be vessels operating in the “exclusive economic 
zone” or vessels within enclosed aquatic ecosystems.  Id. 
106 Id. § 106. 
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the introduction or establishment of aquatic invasive species in waters of 
the United States and contiguous waters of Canada and Mexico.”107  
Unfortunately, this bill did not pass,108 and to date no other legislation has 
been proposed to fill the void left by NANPCA and its amending 
legislation NISA. 
IV.  STATE PROGRAMS 
The United States is a large landmass comprised of a variety of 
ecosystems with a variety of pathways vulnerable to invasive species.  
State regulation is therefore a vital part of any invasive species 
management in the United States.  This is particularly true in light of the 
gaps in federal laws and policies dealing with the problem.  However, 
because states are left to control invasive species without guidance from 
the federal government, there is a wide disparity in the degree and 
effectiveness of state regulation.   
The Environmental Law Institute (“ELI”) performed a fifty-state 
analysis of invasive species laws and regulations in 2002.109  The ELI 
looked at several areas of states’ invasive species laws and regulations to 
determine their effectiveness.  These areas included: (1) the statutory 
definition of “invasive species”; (2) prevention mechanisms, such as 
identifying future threats, detection mechanisms to identify new invaders, 
import, introduction, and release requirements, and quarantine powers; (3) 
control and management authority, emergency powers, and restoration of 
areas following invasion; and (4) coordination of disparate programs 
through a centralized invasive species council and the implementation of a 
management plan.110  The following analysis will discuss state regulations 
and laws according to that rubric to assess the general strengths and 
weaknesses of state invasive species programs.  This analysis will also 
highlight current trends in state invasive species regulation since the 2002 
study. 
A.  Definition 
Most states’ definitions of invasive species did not include a wide 
variety of species and focused on the impact of the species on agriculture, 
rather than its impact on natural areas and public health.111  The definition 
                                                                                                                          
107 Id. § 107. 
108 Great Lakes Collaboration Implementation Act, 2009 BILL TRACKING H.R. 500, 111th Cong. 
(2009). 
109 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION: STATE TOOLS FOR INVASIVE SPECIES 
MANAGEMENT 7–8 (2002) [hereinafter ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION], available at 
http://www.elistore.org/reports_view.asp?file=/Data/products/d12-06.pdf.  
110 Id. at 8–12. 
111 Id. at 27–28. 
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is of vital importance, because only species that can be classified as 
“invasive” will be regulated.  New Hampshire is one state that has adopted 
a comprehensive definition of invasive species, defining it as “an alien 
species whose introduction causes or is likely to cause economic or 
environmental harm or harm to human health.”112 
Once a definition of “invasive species” is in place, a state can create a 
list that designates certain species that fall under that definition.  Most 
states rely on the dirty list approach when creating their lists, where all 
species are permitted entry unless they are formally listed.113  This places 
the burden of determining whether a species will be harmful on the 
regulator.  In contrast, a “clean list” approach only allows introduction of 
species that are listed, which puts the burden on the party wishing to bring 
in the nonnative organism to show that it will not pose an economic or 
environmental threat.114  The highest use of the clean list approach in state 
regulation is for aquatic life, with twenty-one states using a clean list for 
imports115 and seven using a clean list for releases.116 
In a review of eleven states’ invasive species laws since 2002,117 
California118 and Oregon119 have added comprehensive definitions of 
invasive species.  California’s definitions only apply to a prospective 
planning program based exclusively on federal funding and ballast water 
treatment, respectively.120  Additionally, eight of the eleven states remained 
reliant on the dirty list approach, with two exceptions.121  Oregon moved to 
a clean list approach for aquatics and wildlife,122 and Florida moved to a 
tiered approach that has a default rule against possession except for “safe” 
listed species, but with enhanced penalties for certain high-risk species.123  
In general, there has not been much progress towards creating a better, 
                                                                                                                          
112 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 430:52 (LexisNexis 2002). 
113 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 30. 
114 Id. at 29. 
115 Those states are: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia.  Id. at 30–31 n.124. 
116 Those states are: Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee.  Id. at 31 n.126. 
117 The ELI updated its fifty-state survey in 2002 with an eleven-state update in 2010.  The eleven 
states are: California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE INVASIVE 
SPECIES POLICY: 2002–2009, at 6, 9 (2010) [hereinafter ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS], 
available at http://elistore.org/reports_popup.asp?did=11399&file=/Data/products/d20_02.pdf.  The 
study does not explain or clarify why these eleven states were chosen for the update, other than stating 
that their programs were “representative.”  Id. at 9.  
118 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 71200(j) (Deering 2010) (defining the term “[n]onindigenous 
species” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
119 OR. REV. STAT. § 570.755(1) (2009). 
120 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 27. 
121 Maryland already had a white list approach for aquatic invasive species in place.  Id. at 36–37. 
122 OR. ADMIN. R. 635-056-0140(1) (2011). 
123 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 14. 
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more comprehensive definition of invasive species since 2002 in the re-
surveyed states.  Additionally, most states—like the federal government—
remain reliant on the dirty list approach.  Both of these shortcomings leave 
those states more vulnerable to invasion.  
B.  Prevention 
Preventing the introduction and establishment of invasive species 
within their borders is the most practical and cost-effective strategy that 
states can adopt.124  These tools work to prevent the introduction, 
transportation, and spread of invasive species into and within the state.  
There are three main tools necessary to a successful prevention program.  
First, the regulatory agency must have the ability to identify and mitigate 
future threats.  Second, it must have the ability to detect invasive species as 
they begin to infiltrate the state.  Third, it must have requirements for 
importing, introducing, and releasing nonnative species into the state.  
Each of these techniques will be discussed in detail below. 
1.  Identifying and Mitigating Future Threats 
The first tool in prevention is identifying and mitigating future threats.  
By becoming aware of which species are likely to become invasive, states 
can develop strategies to counteract the specific threat and to mitigate 
known invasive pathways.  Despite the power of this tool, very few states 
authorize the use of it.125  In 2002, no state authorized identification of 
future threats for wildlife or insects.126  Only three states authorized 
identification of future threats for aquatic life,127 and only eight did so for 
plant species.128  Since 2002, there has been no change in this pattern.129  
Florida had a model example of a program to identify and mitigate 
future threats.  It authorized a Pest Exclusion Advisory Committee to 
identify high-risk areas for pest introduction as well as non-native plants 
and pests in foreign countries that might pose a future risk to the state.130  
This program was repealed in 2005, thereby cutting off Florida’s ability to 
identify threats before they entered the state.131   
                                                                                                                          
124 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 33; NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES 
COUNCIL, supra note 72, at 29. 
125 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 33. 
126 Id. 
127 Florida, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
128 Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington.  Id. at 33 & 
n.141. 
129 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 17. 
130 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 570.35 (West 2003). 
131 Id.  Although this provision was repealed, Florida does proactively use scientific experts at the 
Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences at the University of Florida to determine whether an 
introduced plant will negatively impact native communities.  FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 5B-57.010(1) 
(2011). 
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The failure of most states to implement a tool like the one Florida at 
one time employed means that states will largely be acting in a reactionary 
manner to established invasive species within the state, rather than 
identifying potential future threats and ways to proactively deal with them. 
2.  Detection 
The second critical tool for states in the prevention of invasion is the 
ability to detect invasive species as they begin to invade the state.  To be 
effective, the regulating agency must have the authority to (1) conduct 
surveys of private and public land to determine if a species is present in the 
state; (2) map locations of invasive species within the state to determine if 
they are spreading; and (3) investigate and inspect reported instances of 
invasive species.132  
This tool is most commonly employed for detection of invasive plant 
species133 and invasive plant pests and diseases.134  California has a model 
detection regulation.  The commissioner of agriculture is authorized to 
conduct surveys and investigations on any premises (public or private) to 
prevent the introduction of harmful insects, animal pests, plant diseases, 
and noxious weeds.135  The commissioner must map the extent and location 
of any infestations,136 and if she receives information of a pest not 
generally found in California, she must investigate its existence and any 
premises liable to become infested.137 
3.  Import/Introduction/Release Requirements 
States need to have requirements controlling the importation, 
introduction, and release of non-native species within their borders because 
this is a basic control mechanism which allows states to regulate what is 
permitted within their borders and into the environment.  Many states 
                                                                                                                          
132 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 36. 
133 Nine states (Arkansas, California, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, and 
West Virginia) authorize surveying for invasive plants.  Id. at 37 & n.148.  Three states (California, 
Montana, and Utah) authorize mapping of invasive species locations.  Id. at 37.  Finally, thirty-eight 
states (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming) authorize the investigation and inspection component of the detection tool.  
Id. at 37 & n.149. 
134 The only three states that do not authorize the inspection and investigation component of the 
detection tool are Connecticut, Idaho, and Utah.  Id. at 37 & n.152. 
135 Id. at 39; see also CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 7272(e) (West 2001) (“The secretary and 
weed management areas shall consider the use of the California Conservation Corp and local 
conservation corps to assist in implementing weed management plans pursuant to this article.”). 
136 See ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 27 (discussing the prevention 
and control and management aspects of California’s regulatory guidelines). 
137 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 39; see also CAL. FOOD & 
AGRIC. CODE §§ 5252–53 (explaining the commissioner’s responsibilities for the eradication and 
control of a discovered pest). 
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require transporters to obtain permits, but the process of obtaining a permit 
varies widely across states.  Some states require a science-based process to 
evaluate all introductions and releases of invasive species for potential 
risks.  On the less restrictive end of the spectrum, some states simply 
consider the possible effect of the release on the public health.138   
Across taxa, states tend to rely upon their dirty or clean list approach to 
determine what species can be imported, introduced, or released, rather 
than relying upon permitting.139  For example, in the regulation of wildlife, 
thirty-four states use their dirty or clean list to determine what species are 
invasive.140  Of those, only ten states also have a permit requirement to 
introduce wildlife,141 twenty-three have a permit requirement to release 
wildlife,142 and twelve have a permit requirement to import wildlife.143  
States that do not have a permitting requirement have no authority to 
regulate nonnative unlisted species brought into the state.  This severely 
limits knowledge of what nonnative unlisted species are within their 
borders. 
Ideally, a state would (1) have permitting requirements in addition to 
restricting entry for all black list species; (2) employ current scientific 
information about a given species to guide its listing requirements and its 
permitting decisions; and (3) only issue permits if the species is not a threat 
to the environment or humans or would not adversely impact state 
industry.144  This would ensure that permitting is considered separately 
from the creation of the list, which is often not updated regularly and is 
therefore not always the most reliable document on current invasive 
threats.145 
In general, since the 2002 study, states have not made many changes to 
strengthen their prevention mechanisms.146  States remain mostly 
                                                                                                                          
138 ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 39. 
139 Id. 
140 Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.  
Id. at 39 & n.158.  
141 Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Carolina, 
and Wisconsin.  Id. at 39 & n.159. 
142 Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id. at 39 & n.160. 
143 California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  Id. at 39 & n.161. 
144 Id. at 42. 
145 See id. (citing Minnesota’s import, introduction, and release requirements in discussing what a 
comprehensive policy should contain). 
146 See ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 9 (noting that most new 
invasive species laws and regulations since 2002 were reactions to the discovery of invasive species 
that received significant attention, and that such changes generally arrived too late to prevent the 
foreseeable harm that those species caused). 
 2011] NEW ZEALAND’S AND THE UNITED STATES’ INVASIVE SPECIES POLICIES 1205 
reactionary to threats, only devoting resources to invasive species that have 
entered the state and caused problems.147  States have limited resources and 
obviously need to react quickly when an invader starts wreaking havoc.  In 
the long run, however, it is much more cost-effective to install more 
restrictive prevention mechanisms than to be forced into a large-scale 
control and management effort once the problems have begun.148 
C.  Control and Management 
If the prevention tool has not been successful and an invasive species 
is introduced into a state, the control and management of that species 
becomes a crucial component to regulating invasive species.  Ideally, a 
state would (1) give authority to its regulatory agency to control and 
manage invasive species on public and private lands; (2) require that 
landowners notify the appropriate authority if an invasive species is on 
their property or if an invasive species has escaped; and (3) establish a 
statewide program to control and manage any such species.149   
Minnesota comes close to this ideal model.150  It authorizes the state 
agency to seize any wildlife that lacks a permit or license.151  It requires a 
landowner to control and eradicate invasive plants, plant pests and 
diseases, and insects, while allowing the state to do the same, should the 
landowner not comply.152  Additionally, anyone responsible for the 
introduction of an invasive species is required to notify the state authority 
and to attempt recapture of any such escaped organisms.153 
In general, states do a good job of creating this general control and 
management authority.  As of 2002, in the statutes and regulations that 
address wildlife, only eleven states lacked some type of general control and 
management authority,154 and only nine states did not have some form of 
                                                                                                                          
147 See id. at 11 (“[T]he vast majority of the significant amendments—particularly at the 
legislative level—were created in response to the discovery of a well-publicized, “charismatic”  
invader. . . .  While species-specific legal authorities are important, they can be characterized as a 
missed opportunity unless they are developed in tandem with legal authorities that offer more general, 
prospective regulatory tools to prevent future introductions.”).   
148 See ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 33 (“Preventing the 
introduction and establishment of invasives is the most proactive and cost-effective strategy that states 
can adopt in the long run.”). 
149 Id. at 66. 
150 Id. 
151 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84D.08(a) (West 2011); ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, 
supra note 109, at 66. 
152 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 18G.03(1)(a)–(b) (West 2011); ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE 
INVASION, supra note 109, at 66. 
153 MINN. STAT. § 84D.08(a); ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 66. 
154 Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, and West Virginia.  ENVTL. LAW INST., HALTING THE INVASION, supra note 109, at 63 & 
n.275. 
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general control and management authority over invasive plant life.155  This 
general provision, however, does not necessarily mean that state authorities 
are provided with the power to enter private lands or that landowners are 
required to report to those authorities.156 
Another tool that is necessary for the effective control and 
management of invasive species is the ability to use emergency powers to 
address sudden outbreaks of an invasive species that can quickly lead to 
widespread damage.  “Components of emergency powers may include the 
ability to dispose of species, bypass notice periods for entering private 
land, and dispense special funds to deal with emergency situations.”157  
Despite the importance of this power, few states utilize it for wildlife,158 
aquatic life,159 or plant life.160  Although states’ approaches to invasive 
species is mainly reactionary, the regulatory agencies are not given the 
power to respond swiftly and with force to an emerging threat, which 
simply delays the response time and allows invasive species more time to 
become entrenched in their new habitat. 
D.  Current Trends 
Current trends in invasive species management have moved towards 
the implementation of interagency councils and management plans.161  
Invasive species laws and regulations are generally codified within the taxa 
they are meant to control, which can make statewide management difficult 
due to a lack of communication across taxa.162  Interagency invasive 
species agencies can overcome this systemic difficulty by coordinating 
funding and coming up with an overall scheme for management, rather 
than going about regulation piecemeal.  Unfortunately, not all states have 
created this agency through legislative fiat,163 and, as a result, the future of 
the agency is not assured.  Despite these issues, however, the creation of 
                                                                                                                          
155 Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island.  Id. at 64 & n.287. 
156 See id. at 64 (describing the approaches taken by various states regarding which entity is 
responsible for the control and management of invasive species on public and private lands). 
157 Id. at 67. 
158 Ten states (Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah) authorize some form of emergency powers for wildlife.  Id. at 67 & 
n.310.  
159 Thirteen states (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington) authorize some form of 
emergency powers for aquatic life.  Id. at 67 & n.312. 
160 Nine states (Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Montana, New York, Oregon, South 
Carolina, and South Dakota) authorize some form of emergency powers for plant life.  Id. at 67 & 
n.314. 
161 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 9. 
162 Id. 
163 Maryland, for instance, has no authorization for its comprehensive invasive species council.  
Id. at 10. 
 2011] NEW ZEALAND’S AND THE UNITED STATES’ INVASIVE SPECIES POLICIES 1207 
these councils and plans will undoubtedly help state invasive species 
programs, so long as they are appropriately funded.164 
V.  NEW ZEALAND’S APPROACH 
New Zealand separated from the ancient continent of Gondwanaland 
80 million years ago and has remained in geographic isolation ever 
since.165  This prolonged isolation explains New Zealand’s unique 
ecosystem—it has no native mammals save two bat species and in the 
absence of these animals, bird and insect species lost their ability to fly in 
order to fill the typical mammal niche on the forest floor.166  As a result, 
New Zealand has an ecosystem evolved without pressures from mammal 
species and has flora and fauna unlike any other place in the world.167 
Invasive plants and animals came to New Zealand with the first human 
colonizers—the Maori.168  European settlers came with even more non-
native organisms, both intentionally and unintentionally.  The effect on the 
delicate ecosystem has been devastating.  Flightless birds and insects that 
specifically adapted to life without mammalian predators or competitors 
are out-competed on the forest floor by mice and rats and are killed by 
stoats and feral cats.169  Indigenous plant-life is also put at risk from 
grazing invasive species like goats, rabbits, and deer.170  Brushtail possum 
are a particular problem for forest ecosystems.171  These animals climb and 
eat the leaves off native tree species.172  In a particular section of the 
Hihitahi Forest Sanctuary, more than ninety percent of standing trees are 
now dead due to possum activity.173   
Plant invaders are also a formidable problem for New Zealand.  
Almost one-half of all vascular plants in New Zealand are introduced, 
which indicates the enormity of invasion that has occurred in the plant 
world.174  Most of these plants were intentionally brought to New Zealand 
                                                                                                                          
164 Id. at 9. 
165 JOHN DAWSON & ROB LUCAS, NATURE GUIDE TO THE NEW ZEALAND FOREST 10–11 (2000). 
166 Id. at 11. 
167 See TERENCE LINDSEY & ROD MORRIS, FIELD GUIDE TO NEW ZEALAND WILDLIFE 10 (2000) 
(“The degree and extent of New Zealand’s isolation is such that much of its fauna and flora is ‘skewed’ 
with respect to the rest of the world.”).  The constitution of species in New Zealand is different from 
that in the rest of the world.  Six percent of all flowering plants are annuals in New Zealand, compared 
with thirteen percent in the rest of the world.  Further, New Zealand has fewer butterfly, bee, and wasp 
species than the global average.  Id. 
168 Id. at 16. 
169 Id. at 16–17. 
170 Id. at 17. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. (describing the devastation that the brushtail possum has wreaked on New Zealand’s 
Hihitahi Forest Sanctuary). 
173 Id. 
174 Mark Christensen, Invasive Species Legislation and Administration: New Zealand, in 
HARMFUL INVASIVE SPECIES, supra note 64, at 23, 27.  About 2,100 plant species were listed as 
“invasive” by the New Zealand Department of Conservation in 1998.  Id.  There are another 19,000 
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for ornamental, agricultural, or horticultural purposes; only eleven percent 
were introduced accidentally.175 
A.  Biosecurity Strategy 
In light of this level of ecosystem decay and the threat of more to 
come, the New Zealand government has taken extreme action to create a 
strong integrated response to invasive species already established in the 
country, as well as to species which are unknown to the native New 
Zealand ecosystem.176  To accomplish this goal, New Zealand has created a 
biosecurity strategy177 that operates on three fronts to deal with the 
problem of invasive species.178  The first front is prevention and exclusion 
of pests and unwanted organisms from entering the country in the first 
place.179  The second front is surveillance and response to detect pests and 
unwanted organisms present in the country as quickly as possible, 
including “deployment of a rapid and effective incursion response that 
maximi[z]es the likelihood of eradication.”180  The last front is pest 
management of invasive species already established within the country.181 
In order to make this strategy successful, the government seeks to 
increase accountability of agencies by giving them clearly defined roles 
and expectations.182  It also seeks to integrate the agencies’ responses to 
problems that affect regional governments, industry groups, and non-
governmental organizations.183  This will increase the efficacy of the 
biosecurity programs by ensuring that all stakeholders will be a part of the 
management strategy for invasive species.  The government also wants to 
have clear risk assessments and priorities dispersed among all entities 
taking action against the problem to create a coordinated effort across all 
management areas.184  Finally, in order to ensure that actions taken for 
biosecurity are successful, key performance indicators are given by the 
government to measure how the strategies are proceeding in meeting the 
                                                                                                                          
non-native plant species in New Zealand in use as ornamental, agricultural, or horticultural species, 
which may still become invasive.  Id.    
175 Id. 
176 Takahashi, supra note 5, at 466. 
177 “Biosecurity” is never defined in legislation, but it is defined in a New Zealand strategy 
document as “the exclusion, eradication or effective management of risks posed by pests and diseases 
to the economy, environment and human health.”  BIOSECURITY COUNCIL, TIAKINA AOTEAROA 
PROTECT NEW ZEALAND: THE BIOSECURITY STRATEGY FOR NEW ZEALAND 5 (2003), available at 
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/biosec/sys/strategy/biosecurity-strategy.pdf. 
178 See id. at 10 (listing goals for the different activities in biosecurity). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 13. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
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overarching goals for the economy, environment, and public health.185 
1.  Administration of the Biosecurity Strategy  
The biosecurity strategy is implemented through the Biosecurity Act of 
1993.186  The Biosecurity Act lays out the organization of administration, 
giving power on the national level to the Minister of Biosecurity187 and to 
regional councils188 to put the strategy into action.   
The Minister of Biosecurity is responsible for coordinating the 
implementation of the Act, recording and coordinating reports of suspected 
new organisms, and managing appropriate responses to such reports.189  
The Minister of Biosecurity does not have its own staff, but instead relies 
on the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (“MAF”), the Department of 
Conservation (“DOC”), the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of 
Fisheries to implement national-level biosecurity programs.190  MAF is the 
lead agency responsible for “pre-border and border activities, surveillance, 
incursion responses and eradication, and the grey zone of transition to pest 
management.”191  MAF is held accountable for the efficient and effective 
delivery of all biosecurity programs.192  
The Minister of Biosecurity is directly advised by the Biosecurity 
Council (the “Council”).  The Council’s key objectives are to (1) provide 
independent advice to the Minister of Biosecurity; (2) evaluate the 
management of the system to be satisfied that the mechanisms work; and 
(3) ensure that stakeholders have a voice in the system’s governance.193  
The Council has an independent chair and is made up of chief executives 
of: MAF; DOC; the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Fisheries; the 
Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology; Te Puni Kokiri (the 
Ministry of Maori Development); the Ministry for the Environment; the 
Environmental Risk Management Authority; primary production industry; 
regional councils; and environmental organizations.194  The creation of 
non-governmental seats on the Council increases stakeholder participation 
in the process of creating and evaluating the biosecurity programs.  The 
presence of the regional councils on the Council allows for on the ground 
feedback from different parts of the country as to problem areas and 
successful strategies. 
                                                                                                                          
185 Id. 
186 Biosecurity Act 1993 (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/ 
0095/latest/DLM314623.html?search=qs_act_biosecurity_resel&p=1&sr=1. 
187 Id. § 8. 
188 Id. § 13. 
189 Id. § 8. 
190 Takahashi, supra note 5, at 467. 
191 BIOSECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 177, at 17. 
192 Id. at 18. 
193 Id. at 21. 
194 Christensen, supra note 174, at 30. 
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This administrative framework is in place to enact the Biosecurity Act 
and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act of 1996 
(“HSNO”),195 the main legislation encompassing the response to invasive 
species.  The Biosecurity Act is the most encompassing legislation, dealing 
with four main categories of biosecurity issues: (1) control of passage of 
goods across the border;196 (2) establishing post-entry quarantine;197 (3) 
monitoring and surveillance of pests and unwanted organisms in New 
Zealand;198 and (4) overseeing eradication and control of established or 
introduced invasive species.199  The HSNO is designed to control the 
intentional introduction of new organisms into New Zealand.200  Working 
in tandem, the legislation limits both the damage from established invasive 
species and the release of new invasive species. 
B.  Biosecurity Act of 1993 
1.  Importation 
Border control of risk goods is a vital aspect of the Biosecurity Act.  
“Risk goods” is defined as any organism or substance that is suspected to 
cause harm to natural or physical resources or human health or interfere 
with the diagnosis, management, or treatment of pests or unwanted 
organisms within the country.201  Any organism must also comply with the 
HSNO provisions for new organisms.202   
Most risk goods which enter the country need an Import Health 
Standard (“IHS”) which analyzes many factors such as the effects of the 
product on the people, environment, and economy of New Zealand and the 
likelihood that it may bring organisms into the country.203  There is generic 
risk analysis for broad groups of animals and animal products, which helps 
to speed up the process.  Still, it is a time-consuming process to propagate 
an IHS, requiring internal consultation, peer review, and full public 
                                                                                                                          
195 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0030/latest/DLM381222.html?search=ts_act_hazardous
+substances+and+new+organisms+act_resel&p=1&sr=1. 
196 Biosecurity Act 1993, § 25 (N.Z.). 
197 Id. § 41. 
198 Id. § 42. 
199 Id. § 54. 
200 See Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act § 4 (“The purpose of this Act is to protect 
the environment, and the health and safety of people and communities, by preventing or managing the 
adverse effects of hazardous substances and new organisms.”)  “New organism” as defined by the 
HSNO is, among other things, a species that was not present in New Zealand as of July 29, 1998; a 
genetically modified organism not approved for release; a species of any organisms that has 
containment approval, conditional release approval, or approval for release with controls; or an 
organism that has been eradicated from New Zealand.  Id. § 2A(1).  This Note will not attempt to 
address legislation pertaining to regulation of genetically modified organisms. 
201 Biosecurity Act § 2(1). 
202 Id. § 28A(1), (3). 
203 Id. § 22(1), (5). 
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consultation with direct notification to all people and entities that might be 
affected by the proposed IHS.204   
2.  Management and Eradication of Invasive Species  
Pest management strategies (“PMS”) are the main way pests are 
eradicated and controlled in New Zealand.205  Anyone can submit a 
proposal for a national PMS, such as the implementation of a PMS for 
American Foulbrood, which infects honey bees and was initiated by bee 
keepers looking to protect their hives.206  Once submitted, the proposal 
document may be notified by the Minister of Biosecurity207 seeking 
comment from potentially affected parties.  If the Minister finds there is 
opposition to a significant element of the proposal, he must give the 
proposal to the Board of Inquiry for review.208  The Board of Inquiry then 
prepares a recommendation for the Minister, which he must consider 
before making his decision regarding the proposed PMS.209  This process is 
time-consuming and rarely utilized.210  Instead, most pest management is 
done through regional PMS. 
The Biosecurity Act gives authority to regional councils to monitor 
and survey pests and unwanted organisms as well as implement regional 
PMS and small-scale management programs.211  Regional councils have 
primary responsibility for the eradication and management of invasive 
species in New Zealand and are administered by publicly elected 
members.212  The process of creating regional PMS is similar to the 
national level, but is done with a regional council serving as the manager 
of the application.  Anyone can write a regional PMS proposal of which 
                                                                                                                          
204 Christensen, supra note 174, at 37. 
205 Id. at 38. 
206 Id. at 39. 
207 The Minister must consider factors such as (1) whether the benefits of the strategy would 
outweigh the costs, including the consequences of inaction or alternate action; (2) whether the net 
benefits of national intervention outweigh the benefits of regional intervention; (3) whether the 
organism would cause “serious adverse and unintended effect” to the economy, environmental health, 
or human health and wellbeing of New Zealanders; and (4) that this strategy will not conflict with 
international obligations.  Biosecurity Act 1993, § 57(1) (N.Z.). 
208 Id. § 63(1). 
209 Id. § 69(1). 
210 See Christensen, supra note 174, at 39 (“Central government has been slow to develop national 
PMS.  [As of 2004], only two had been finalized . . . .”). 
211 Biosecurity Act § 13(1)(a)–(e).  Small-scale management programs can be undertaken if the 
regional council believes that (1) the unwanted organism could cause “serious adverse and unintended 
effects unless early action . . . is taken”; (2) the organism can be eradicated within three years of 
undertaking the control measures; (3) the undertaking is likely to cost less than a larger scale action; (4) 
the undertaking is unlikely to cost significant monetary loss to any person (except persons who 
contributed to the unwanted organism’s presence or spread by failing to follow the Biosecurity Act or 
any other pest management strategy; and (5) the regional council gives notice of the intention to create 
this management program.  Id. § 100(1). 
212 Christensen, supra note 174, at 28–29. 
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the regional council may notify the public.213  This mode of PMS is much 
more often used then the national PMS and imposes pest control 
obligations on landowners.214 
The importance of the regional council members is reflected in the 
appointment of regional councils to the Council.  By creating an identical 
mechanism for different regional councils across New Zealand to enact 
pest-management strategies, the national government has taken a large step 
towards standardizing local responses to invasive species. 
C.  Hazardous Safety and New Organism Act of 1996 
The HSNO is a regulatory framework for the intentional introduction 
of new organisms into New Zealand.215  A “new organism” is defined by 
the HSNO as an organism that was not present in New Zealand at the time 
the HSNO was enacted (July 1998); an organism which has been given 
containment approval, conditional release approval, or release approval 
with controls; a genetically modified species; or an organism from a 
species which has been previously eradicated from New Zealand.216   
Any new organism seeking entry into New Zealand must be approved 
by the Environmental Risk Management Authority (“ERMA”).  ERMA is 
a quasi-judicial, decision-making body made up of six to eight members 
and appointed by the Minister of the Environment.217  Currently, ERMA is 
made up of eight members, five of whom have a scientific background 
including entomology, microbiology, human health, and wildlife 
management.218 
In order to bring a new organism into New Zealand, ERMA must carry 
out a risk assessment at the expense of the applicant.  Organisms which 
were thought to have been present before July 1998 are kept on registers 
maintained by Biosecurity New Zealand and accessible online.219  If it is 
not clear whether the organism is a new organism, a “‘determination’ 
application form” must be submitted to ERMA.220  Any new organism 
                                                                                                                          
213 The regional council may notify after considering (1) whether the benefits of the strategy 
would outweigh the costs, including the consequences of inaction or alternate action; (2) whether the 
benefit of regional intervention exceeds the benefit of individual intervention; and (3) whether the 
organism would cause “serious adverse and unintended effect” to the economy, environmental health, 
or human health and wellbeing of the region in question.  Biosecurity Act § 72(1). 
214 See Christensen, supra note 174, at 39 (“In contrast to national PMS, regional PMS have been 
developed for most of New Zealand’s regions and impose pest control obligations on landowners.”). 
215 Id. at 33. 
216 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, § 2A(1) (N.Z.). 
217 Id. §§ 15–16. 
218 The Authority, ERMA, http://www.ermanz.govt.nz/about/authority.html (last visited Apr. 13, 
2011). 
219 Check What Organisms Are Already Legally Present in New Zealand, ERMA, 
http://www.ermanz.govt.nz/no/aboutno/check.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Check What 
Organisms] (click “Plants Biosecurity Index” or follow links to “Biosecurity New Zealand”). 
220 Id. 
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must be approved by ERMA for import or release in the field.  In 
considering approval, ERMA must take into account factors such as the 
sustainability of native and valued introduced flora and fauna, the intrinsic 
value of ecosystems, public health, the relationship of the Maori with their 
ancestral lands, the economic benefits and costs of using a particular new 
organism, and New Zealand’s international obligations.221  It also cannot 
grant applications for new organisms that may displace native species, 
deteriorate natural habitats, or pose significant adverse effects on human or 
environmental health.222  In other words, ERMA can only grant approval if 
it feels that the positive effects of the organism outweigh the adverse 
effects.  ERMA’s decision is discretionary, and applicants have no general 
right to appeal ERMA’s decision, except regarding questions of law, which 
may be appealed to the High Court.223 
New Zealand implements a “clean list” approach here, by refusing 
automatic entry to any organism not present in New Zealand before the 
enactment of HSNO.  Biosecurity New Zealand also maintains a “dirty 
list” of organisms not allowed into the country.224  This dirty list, however, 
is merely a list of absolutely forbidden organisms; any importer of 
organisms must still show that they are importing an organism present in 
New Zealand before 1998, or they must apply for entry through ERMA. 
D.  Biosecurity Strategy and Science 
Central to New Zealand’s biosecurity strategy is a commitment to 
utilize science in dealing with invasive species.  In 2007, the Minister of 
Biosecurity promulgated “A Biosecurity Science Strategy for New 
Zealand,” which set forth a twenty-five-year plan to “develop clear advice 
on priority research needs and the uptake of research into the future.”225  
The goal of the document was to create guidance for what research to 
undertake and to ensure that research was not being duplicated or used 
ineffectively.226 
This strategy sets forth many objectives in its action plan, including 
increasing the effectiveness of communications between scientists and end-
users of the information,227 focusing research on issues of prevention, 
rather than mitigation,228 and focusing research on areas of high priority.229  
                                                                                                                          
221 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act § 6. 
222 Id. § 36. 
223 Id. § 126(1). 
224 There are currently thirty-seven types of organisms forbidden from entry under the HSNO 
Schedule 2.  Id. (Second Schedule).  
225 MAF BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND, A BIOSECURITY SCIENCE STRATEGY FOR NEW 
ZEALAND—MAHERE RAUTAKI PUTAIAO WHAKAMARU i (2007), available at 
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/biosec/sys/strategy/2007-biosecurity-science-strategy.pdf.  
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 39. 
228 Id. at 42. 
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In all, the proposal sets out twenty-two goals for increasing the 
effectiveness of scientific research in New Zealand and lays out the 
timetable for when all of these goals should be fulfilled.230  By doing so, 
New Zealand has attempted to address what it sees as weaknesses in its 
scientific research by setting forth clear guidelines and attainment dates. 
The literature on the New Zealand policy is missing an analysis of how 
the policy works as enacted.  Although this is a broad-reaching and 
comprehensive program, insufficient funding or staffing would eviscerate 
the power of the statutes.  Learning how this policy is implemented on the 
ground is the final piece in understanding how effective the New Zealand 
program actually is. 
V.  LESSONS TO LEARN: WHAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE DOING 
Before discussing what the United States can learn from the New 
Zealand biosecurity strategy, it is important to point out the obvious—there 
are significant differences between New Zealand and the United States 
which prevent the policy of one from being easily adopted by the other.  
The size of the two countries, the relative volume of items coming into 
both countries, and issues of federalism, like the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, must be taken into account when analyzing the policies of the two 
countries side by side.  Despite these factors, however, there are many 
basic principles in New Zealand’s policy that can be applied to improving 
the way the United States manages invasive species within the country and 
at its borders. 
A.  Clean List Versus Dirty List Approach for Intentional Introductions 
New Zealand uses a clean list231 of organisms already present in the 
country and a dirty list232 of organisms that cannot be allowed into the 
country.  This is extremely beneficial because it does not simply assume 
that organisms that are not on the dirty list are allowed into the country.  
There is a rigorous application procedure for allowing a new organism 
(which is not on the clean list) into the country.233  ERMA must feel that 
the organism is likely to have a greater benefit to the country than negative 
effect in order for it to be allowed past the border.234   
The United States only uses a dirty list approach under the Lacey 
                                                                                                                          
229 Id. at 43. 
230 See id. at 46–59 (listing the abovementioned goals and timetables). 
231 Check What Organisms, supra note 219.   
232 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, Second Schedule (N.Z.). 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 216–24 for a discussion of the application process for a 
new organism into New Zealand. 
234 See supra text accompanying note 223. 
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Act.235  The flaw in using a dirty list approach alone is that organisms not 
present on the list are then automatically allowed into the country, without 
a thought to potential invasiveness.  In New Zealand, the applicant must 
pay for ERMA’s consideration of its application, so the country does not 
have to be responsible for the administrative costs.236  That said, it seems 
improbable that the United States could maintain a list of all species of 
organisms living within its borders as New Zealand does.  This does not 
mean, however, that a clean list approach is impossible to maintain in the 
United States.  Some level of risk assessment for organisms being let 
inside our borders is a positive step forward and can lead to the creation of 
a more comprehensive clean list. 
The U.S. House of Representatives has introduced a bill that would 
create an approach very similar to what is done in New Zealand.  The 
Nonnative Wildlife Invasion Prevention Act, introduced on January 26, 
2009, proposed a risk assessment process “to prevent the introduction into, 
and establishment in, the United States of nonnative wildlife species that 
will cause or are likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm 
to other animal species’ health or human health.”237   
The bill gives a list of factors to consider in determining whether to 
allow an organism into the country.  This includes the identity of the 
organism, native range of the species, whether the species has established 
or caused harm to the environment in ecosystems that are similar to those 
in the United States, and the likelihood that the organism would cause 
harm in the United States.238  This would establish a “clean list” of species 
allowed into the country and a “dirty list” of organisms barred from it.239  
If the organism passes the risk assessment made by the Secretary of the 
Interior, then the organism will be allowed into the country.  This is 
exactly the kind of legislation needed in the United States, which utilizes a 
very similar framework to the one in the HSNO. 
States also need to learn from the success of New Zealand’s clean list 
approach.  Most states are reactionary in their treatment of invasive 
species.  They utilize a dirty list approach that only identifies species that 
have already caused problems within the state.240  They do not have 
programs for wide-scale preventative measures, such as identifying 
                                                                                                                          
235 See supra text accompanying notes 37–42 for a discussion of the dirty list approach under the 
Lacey Act. 
236 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act § 21. 
237 Nonnative Wildlife Invasion Prevention Act, H.R. 669, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
238 Id. § 3. 
239 See 155 CONG. REC. E135, E142 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2009) (statement of Rep. Madeleine Z. 
Bordallo) (explaining that the bill would allow for the creation of a “green list” of species that could be 
imported into the United States and a “black list” of species barred from entering the country (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
240 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 7. 
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possible threats and addressing pathways of invasion.241  States need to 
move toward use of a clean list approach in managing invasive species in 
order to become more proactive against future threats. 
B.  Centralization of Accountability 
One of the major flaws in the United States’ invasive species policy is 
its fragmented nature.  There is separate legislation for aquatic invaders,242 
plant invaders,243 and border control.244  All of that separate legislation 
might be workable, but there lacks strong centralization in implementation 
of these provisions and accountability for ensuring their success.  
Executive Order 13,112 does place accountability in the National Invasive 
Species Council, however, no individual is held accountable for the 
success of the invasive species policies.245  New Zealand’s policy places 
ultimate responsibility for the effective implementation of its biosecurity 
strategy on the Minister for Biosecurity.246  This ensures that one person’s 
entire job is focused on the success of invasive species management.  
Moving accountability from the National Invasive Species Council as a 
whole to one lead member of the Council would increase the efficacy of 
Executive Order 13,112 by placing one person’s job on the line should the 
policy not be effectively implemented.  
Furthermore, the United States would benefit from having one 
organization overseeing all invasive species management.  All biosecurity 
in New Zealand is ultimately managed by MAF.247  Other departments may 
run specific programs per their expertise—such as programs for aquatic 
invasive species run by the Ministry of Fisheries—but, ultimately, MAF is 
responsible for all active biosecurity programs in New Zealand.  This is not 
the case in the United States.  The National Invasive Species Council runs 
its own programs, but is not ultimately responsible for coordinating aquatic 
invasive species programs per NANPCA.248  
States are moving toward a reliance on invasive species councils, 
although these councils are often taxa-specific agencies dealing only with 
aquatic invaders, for example.249  It would be most effective if there was a 
federal council that interacted with it and created policy with 
comprehensive invasive species on the state level so that they could 
                                                                                                                          
241 Id. at 11. 
242 Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701–14 
(2006). 
243 Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–86 (2006). 
244 Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2006). 
245 Exec. Order. No. 13,112, 3 C.F.R. 159–62 (1999). 
246 Biosecurity Act 1993, § 8 (N.Z.). 
247 BIOSECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 177, at 17. 
248 The administration of NANPCA is left to the Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force, an 
unrelated body. 16 U.S.C. § 4722(a) (2006). 
249 ENVTL. LAW INST., STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 117, at 11. 
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communicate successes and areas of weakness with each other. 
C.  Commitment to Science 
New Zealand is aware that scientific research of vectors of introduction 
and methods of eradication is vital to a successful invasive species 
management and control program.250  ERMA and the Council have 
members with science backgrounds to administrate in light of their 
scientific knowledge.  Furthermore, the Biosecurity Science Strategy put 
forth by MAF lays out goals and achievement dates for improvements in 
increasing communication between scientists and end-users and for making 
sure that the correct priorities are used in determining what research to 
fund.251 
The National Invasive Species Council is made up of several cabinet 
members.252  Although these are high-level officials, some of whom have a 
scientific background, the focus of the members of the National Invasive 
Species Council is neither specifically on science nor exclusively on the 
issue before them.  The National Invasive Species Council should either 
have members who come solely with a science-based perspective or create 
another council that only considers scientific factors. 
The United States does have a funding program for invasive species 
research, however, it is split between different agencies, all offering money 
for different research, with no guiding document to organize it all.253  The 
creation of a strategy like the Biosecurity Science Strategy from New 
Zealand would allow for a well-thought-out approach to research on these 
issues, rather than the more ad hoc approach to research that the United 
States currently has. 
D.  Appreciation of Regional Management Efforts 
Currently, the United States has not set forth any procedures for 
standardizing how states approach invasive species management.254  Under 
the Biosecurity Act in New Zealand, regional councils do most of the 
invasive species management and eradication, but they have a nationally 
                                                                                                                          
250 MAF BIOSECURITY NEW ZEALAND, supra note 225, at i, iii. 
251 Id. at 45–59. 
252 The National Invasive Species Council is made up of the following U.S. agencies and 
departments: the Department of Agriculture; the Department of the Interior; the Department of 
Commerce; the Department of Defense; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Department of 
Transportation; the Department of State; the Department of Homeland Security; the Agency for 
International Development; the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration; the Department of Treasury; and the Department of Health and Human Services.  
NISC Member Departments and Agencies, NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, 
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/index_department_agencies.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
253 Research, NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, http://www.invasivespecies.gov/global/ 
research/research_index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011). 
254 But see supra text accompanying notes 37–42 for a discussion of the Lacey Act. 
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mandated process to which they must conform when promulgating a 
PMS.255  Individual states in the United States have a variety of invasive 
species plans which range from highly effective to barely present.  
Developing a framework through which states must create invasive species 
programs will give homogeneity to the assessment factors that must be 
considered. 
New Zealand has also incorporated regional council members into the 
Council to weigh in on nationwide policy decisions.256  The majority of 
PMS occur on the regional level; allowing regional council members to 
have a seat on the Council gives the people who know what it is like on the 
ground a direct voice in decision-making.  There is no such similar device 
in the United States’ invasive species management system.  Although 
states do a great amount of the invasive species management, their only 
representation is from members of Congress who may not have invasive 
species at the forefront of their agenda.  It is vital to allow states to have an 
active voice on the national level to discuss problems and solutions.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The United States’ framework for invasive species prevention and 
management is currently a hodge-podge of federal legislation.  There is 
neither an overarching guiding agency nor guiding principles allowing it to 
function as a cohesive whole.  The gaps left in preventing introductions 
make management and eradication efforts much costlier for taxpayers and 
costlier for the environment.  States are therefore left with a large 
responsibility for creating adequate programs.  Without federal guidance 
and with limited federal funding, states often do not create an invasive 
species management program that effectively fills the gaps. 
New Zealand, by contrast, has a comprehensive biosecurity policy that 
is overseen by its own Minister and puts ultimate responsibility on one 
ministry.257  The United States would be greatly served by moving to a 
model that coalesces oversight of its invasive species programs under the 
purview of one agency.  This would let one agency see the big picture of 
everything that is going on in the country on a national level.  Additionally, 
by putting responsibility on one person and one agency, accountability 
would also fall on that person and agency to follow up on techniques that 
are not working well and to fix them. 
New Zealand also uses a “dirty list” for organisms trying to enter the 
country, together with a “clean list,” which prevents new species from 
                                                                                                                          
255 Biosecurity Act 1993, § 13 (N.Z.). 
256 Christensen, supra note 174, at 30. 
257 Biosecurity Act § 8. 
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entering the country without a risk assessment.258  Although mistakes can 
still be made, it is a more cautious approach than simply letting in all 
organisms not marked on the dirty list and only realizing afterwards that 
they are pervasive invaders.  Currently, through the Lacey Act, the United 
States exclusively utilizes the dirty list approach.259  The Nonnative 
Wildlife Invasion Prevention Act, currently a bill brought by the House of 
Representatives, would begin using clean and dirty list approaches, which 
would be a giant step forward in invasive species prevention.260 
Finally, giving a voice to state-level invasive species administrators on 
the national level through inclusion on the National Invasive Species 
Council would allow states to have a dialogue with each other and the 
federal government as to problem areas and successes.  New Zealand gives 
such voice to regional councils on its Council, and has enjoyed great 
success through empowerment of local government in this way.261 
The United States has a long way to go in its invasive species program.  
Hopefully, it can learn from other countries, like New Zealand, that, 
because of their unique ecosystems, have had to quickly come up with 
effective techniques for managing the invasive species problem.  Bills like 
the Nonnative Wildlife Invasion Prevention Act are a good step toward the 
kind of invasive species legislation that is so necessary for the country.  
With a little more work, the United States can move to a comprehensive 
and effective invasive species policy. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                          
258 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, Second Schedule (N.Z.); Check What 
Organisms, supra note 219.  
259 See supra text accompanying notes 37–42. 
260 Nonnative Wildlife Invasion Prevention Act, H.R. 669, 111th Cong. §§ 4–5 (2009). 
261 See Christensen, supra note 174, at 30 (“The coordination of strategic advice on policy matters 
by the Biosecurity Council is recognized as a significant strength of the biosecurity system.  It fosters 
good working relationships among the four government departments with biosecurity functions, and the 
regional councils.”). 
